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guardsman tried by a summary court-martial, where no counsel is
provided, was entitled to object to such trial and to be tried by a
special or general court-martial where counsel is provided."7
Many servicemen tried by special courts-martial are young and
are draftees. In civilian life, from which they have recently come,
one's right to a lawyer has been upheld in a misdemeanor case in
which a sentence of ninety days was imposed. 8 Considering these
factors and the fact that a court-martial conviction can frequently
have effects that continue in civilian life, perhaps the military should
no longer be, in the words of the case here noted, "a constitutionally
uninhabitable wasteland beyond even the scan of the Great Writ
where the court is powerless to reach out a protective hand,"8 19 at
least as far as providing legal counsel is concerned.
PHILIP L.

KELLOGG

Torts-Police Immunity-Civil Rights Arrests
The Fifth Circuit decision in Pierson v. Ray1 illustrates the predicament of police officers, both at common law and under federal
statute, with respect to liability for torts arising out of the official
scope of their authority. In Pierson police officers arrested plaintiffs,
participants in a civil rights pilgrimage, for disorderly conduct under
a Mississippi statute2 when they attempted to enter a coffee shop
in a bus terminal. They were convicted at a trial before a police
justice but on appeal to the county court, where there was a trial
de novo, were found not guilty. They then brought suit against
the arresting officers in federal district court alleging a common-law
tort claim for false imprisonment and a statutory claim for depriva" Application of Palacio, 48 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In a
special court-martial however, under the UCMJ, "counsel" need not be a
lawyer. Hence this state case does not really shed light on the principal
question
of the right to legal counsel.
38
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
246 F. Supp. at 322.
1352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK
3306 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1966) (No. 1074).
2 The statute in effect provides that whoever congregates in any public
accommodation where a breach of the peace is threatened and fails to disperse when ordered to do so by any law enforcement officer is guilty of
disorderly conduct. MIss. CODE ANN. § 2087.5 (Supp. 1964).
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tion of their civil rights under section 1983 of the Judicial Code.'
A jury found for the defendants, and on appeal the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that, although the doctrine of official immunity protected
the police officers from the common-law claim,4 that defense was
not available under section 1983. However, the court concluded
from the memoranda used in organizing the pilgrimage that it
could be inferred the plaintiffs invited or consented to the arrest,
which would preclude recovery on the civil rights claim. Thus a new
trial was ordered to determine this question of fact.
The legal reasoning behind the court's decision seems unsound.'
The court was apparently struggling to find a way to prevent liability of a police officer acting in good faith within the scope of his
authority in order to place him in a position comparable to that of
other public officers. It is well established that, in the absence of
' Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1964).

'As is subsequently discussed, this does not appear to be the general
rule, and the court in asserting it cites its previous decision in Norton v.
McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964). However, that case involved
federal and not state or local officials.
'The decision appears vulnerable to attack in the following manner: (1)
Even before Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964), if the plaintiffs were completely orderly, which
they were in this case, they had a legal right to eat in the coffee shop of
the bus terminal. The Interstate Commerce Act, 76 Stat. 397, 49 U.S.C. §
316(d) (1964), provides that a passenger has a federal right to be served
without discrimination in an interstate bus terminal. The Supreme Court
in 1960 interpreted the statute to mean that one was on the premises "under
authority of law" and that a state statute making it unlawful to remain
after being forbidden to do so was invalid in such a case. Boynton v.
Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960). The defendants thus had no authority for
the arrest and deprived plaintiffs of a "right' secured by the Constitution
and laws. (2) Although the court in Pierson attempts to distinguish the
decision in Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 975 (1964), on a procedural ground, that decision seems clearly
on point. The plaintiffs were arrested under a breach-of-the-peace statute
similar to the one involved in Pierson while they were eating with a group
of Negroes in a cafe. After acquittal on the charges the plaintiffs sued the
arresting police officers. The court held there was total lack of legal justification for the arrest, as there was nothing that remotely resembled a breach
of the peace, and therefore the act of the officers was unlawful, the imprisonment false, and the defendants liable for their conduct violating rights of
freedom from unlawful arrest and freedom of association.
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legislative, 7

8

federal statute, judicial,'
and executive officials are
immune from suit based on wrongful conduct, where they are acting within the general scope of their authority or in the discharge
of their duties. The immunity of executive officials9 has been applied
to numerous officials for many different torts.'" The law with respect to subordinate executive officials, however, is inconsistent.
Many courts draw the distinction between torts growing out of
"discretionary" actions and those growing out of "ministerial" actions, holding that where official action involves the exercise of
discretion, it is protected, but where the challenged action is ministerial, no immunity is afforded.",
Most jurisdictions hold individual police officers personally
'E.g., Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Fraley v. Ramey, 239 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.W.

Va. 1965); Hardy v. Kirchner, 232 F. Supp. 751 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Haigh
v. Snidow, 231 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Cal. 1964).

'E.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
8
E.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.
483 (1895); Bershad v. Wood, 290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961); Papagianakis
v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921
(1951); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950); Gamage v. Peal, 217 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
"Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895), is generally considered the first
decision applying the immunity doctrine to executive officials.
" E.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (Acting Director of Office
of Rent Stabilization-malicious defamation); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d
855 (5th Cir. 1964) (officials of United States Department of Justicemalicious arrest and imprisonment); Blitz v. Boog, 328 F.2d 596 (2d Cir.
1964) (government psychiatrist-false imprisonment); Bershad v. Wood,
290 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1961) (Internal Revenue Service officers); Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
921 (1951) (immigration officials-false imprisonment); Gamage v. Peal,
217 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (Air Force doctor). The doctrine has
even been stretched to include a civilian supervisor of pavement maintenance
at a 1missile site. See Garner v. Rathburn, 346 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1965).
" E.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895); Papagianakis v. The
Samos, supra note 10. See cases cited note 10 supra. See generally 2 HARPER
& JAMES, TORTS § 29.10 (1956). The distinction has been widely criticized

by many authorities. Judge Medina in Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v.
Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963)
reasoned:
There is no litmus paper test to distinguish acts of discretion . . .
and to require a finding of "discretion" would merely postpone, for
one step in the process of reasoning, the determination of the real
question-is the act complained of the result of a judgment or decision
which it is necessary that the Government official be free to make
without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and alleged
personal liability?
See generally Comment, 44 CALIF. L. Rv. 887, 888-89 (1956).
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liable for torts growing out of their law enforcement activities without regard to the ministerial-discretionary distinction.12 This is presumably the result of the common-law tradition in tort making every
man responsible for the natural consequences of his own action. 3
However, why should the police officer be an exception to the general immunity doctrine involving other public officials? The anomaly
is stretched to an even greater disparity in the situation where a
police officer is personally liable for false imprisonment that is a
result of an arrest made in good faith, whereas a judge charged
with the same tort, 4 as well as the district attorney who is alleged
to have prosecuted the person through spite and malice,'- are uniformally held to be immune. Hence, the action that resulted in
malicious imprisonment is immune, but the action that resulted in
good faith imprisonment leads to personal liability.
Under federal law the police officer may be in an even worse
position than at common law. Although section 1983 speaks in
terms of the liability of "every person" who under color of state law
deprives one of a federally secured right, this broad language has
been interpreted not to mean that Congress intended to abrogate
any common-law immunity afforded judicial,' legislative,' 7 or high
executive officials.'" However, where the suit involves subordinate
officials not directly participating in legislative or judicial processes,
" See, e.g., Mathes & Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Iminunity for Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965).
California does recognize this distinction. See, e.g., Ne Casek v. City of
Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131, 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1965).
"8 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The only area in which police
officers are afforded any protection is when they are found to be acting in
a quasi-judicial capacity and are thus deemed officers of the court. See, e.g.,
Summers v. McNamara, 239 F. Supp. 806 (D. Ore. 1965). The Fifth
Circuit clearly recognizes this principle and applied it to a codefendant in
Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
975 (1964).
"4E.g., Arnold v. Bostick, 339 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1964); Rhodes v.
Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); Harvey
v. Sadler, 331 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1964); Sires v. Cole, 320 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1963). The court in Pierson also applied the general rule to a
codefendant. See cases cited note 6 supra.
1 See, e.g., Hurlburt v. Graham, 323 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Sires v.
Cole, 320 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1963); Kostal v. Stoner, 292 F.2d 492 (10th
Cir. 1961); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Zellner v.
F. Supp. 874 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
Wallace, 233
" See cases cited note 14 supra.
"Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
" Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
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there is uncertainty in the law to what extent, if any, they are protected.""
The Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape20 seems to
resolve the question where local police officers are involved. Although the Court did not expressly discuss the immunity concept,
the result has been interpreted as necessarily implying a rejection
of this defense as a general proposition. 2 The Court, in Monroe,
went even further when it stated that individual police officers are
personally liable for violations under section 1983 without proof of
a specific intent to deprive one of a federal right as required by the
criminal sections of the statute.2 2 Although the facts in the case
depict a horrid example of police excess justifying liability, the
decision can place the police officer in an undesirable position, since
it may result in liability even though he may be acting in good faith
within the scope of his authority.2 3 This problem has led many
courts since Monroe to distinguish it on the basis of its peculiar fact
situation,24 i.e., outrageous conduct on the part of the police officers.
The decisions have expressed the idea that the actionable conduct
should be "reprehensible"" or "callous and shocking"2 before
liability should be imposed.
The basic policy advanced for application of the immunity doc"1Id. at 860-61. See generally Comment, 18 ARK. L. Rav. 81 (1965);
Comment, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 887 (1956).
20365 U.S. 167 (1961).
2 Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
22 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
For the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the specific intent required see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
2" Cohen v. Norris, 300
F.2d 24, 34 (9th Cir. 1962) pointed out that
the expanded interpretation of the statute in Monroe could lead to an opening of the "flood gates" to private action brought under it but holds it is
up to Congress to change this. This warning is exemplified by the fact
that in 1945, the year of the Screws decision, the total number of private
actions brought under the civil rights statutes in federal courts was 29.
ADmIN. DIR. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 83, at table c-2 (1945). In the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1961, during which Monroe was decided, the number
was 270. ADMIN. DIR. U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 238, at table c-2 (1961).
Three years later the number was 645. ADmIx. DIR. U.S. COURTS ANN.
REP. 218, at table c-2 (1964).
2" See, e.g., Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1963); Bowens
v. Knazze, 237 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965); Raab v. Patacchia, 232 F.
Supp. 71 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp. 167
(S.D. Cal. 1964); Selico v. Jackson, 201 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
See generally, Shapo, Con.stitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and The
FrontiersBeyond, 60 NW. U.L. REv. 277 (1965).
2" Striker v. Pancher, 317 F.2d 780, 784 (6th Cir. 1963).
" Raab v. Patacchia, 232 F. Supp. 71, 94 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
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trine to public officials is to promote fearless performance of duty.

7

To permit a citizen to have an action for damages where a police
officer is acting in good faith undermines this basic policy.2" The
threat of personal financial liability hanging over the police officer
in the performance of official duty is a continual and substantial
deterrent to effective law enforcement. As one writer has stated:
"Confronted with such a delicate choice and personal responsibility
for its correctness, it would not be surprising if police officers generally decided to err on the side of caution and think of home and
' 9
family instead of the public interest in law enforcement."
It can also be said that where the conduct of the police officer is
not found to be outrageous but rather a good faith performance of
his duty, the real grievance is against the state or municipality that
employs him. However, with regard to suits under section 1983,
the Monroe decision unanimously rejected the idea that Congress
intended to bring municipal corporations within the purview of the
statute, thus unfortunately blocking one possible solution to the
problem. 0
The Pierson decision also illustrates another predicament of the
police officer. The state statute authorizing the defendants to make
1
the arrest was subsequently declared unconstitutional." Should the
police officer who acts in an otherwise nontortious manner but under
the authority of a presumptively valid state statute be liable for his
actions if the statute is subsequently declared unconstitutional? The
majority of jurisdictions still hold the police officer liable on the
theory that an unconstitutional statute imposes no duty on officials
to enforce it and affords no protection to anyone acting under
33
authority of it. 2 However, a growing number of jurisdictions,
"'Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950).
28 See generally, Jaffe, Suits Against Government Officers: Damage Action, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209 (1963).
" Mathes & Jones, supra note 12, at 898.
8
8 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965). The court cited Boynton
v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960), as the basis for its per curium decision.
See note 5 supra.
" E.g., Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886); Miller v. Stinnett,
257 F.2d 910 (10th Cir. 1958); Smith v. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 290 P.2d
742 (1955).
.. E.g., Manson v. Wabash R.R. Co., 338 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1960);
Yekhtikian v. Blessing, 90 R.I. 287, 157 A.2d 669 (1960); Bricker v. Sims,
195 Tenn. 361, 259 S.W.2d 661 (1953); Wichita County v. Robinson, 155
Tex. 1, 276 S.W.2d 509 (1954).
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including Mississippi, 4 have reached the opposite, and sounder, result. In Bowens v. Knazze,m an action brought under section 1983,
a federal district court reasoned that
the retroactive application of the judgment of a court as to the
requirements of the Constitution-based not on community standards but on legal reasoning-would place a defendant in an impossible position.
It would require law enforcement officers to respond in
damages every time they miscalculated in regard to what a court
of last resort would determine constituted a invasion of constitutional rights, even where, as here, a trial judge-more learned
in the law than a police officer- held that no such violation occurred.3 6
7
This appears to be the more reasonable approach.1
In all the situations mentioned above, the balance between the
need for fearless performance of duty on the part of police officers
wihtout fear of harassment and the corresponding need for satisfying the loss of an injured party would best be achieved by a finding
of no liability where an officer acts in good faith within the scope
of his authority."' It would seem that the Fifth Circuit in Pierson
could have established a far more sound and workable criterion
for the future by adopting this approach. This would mean that if
the defendants were in fact acting in bad faith, then liability would
be imposed; however where the officer was acting in good faith,
there would be no liability. The question of bad faith would be
for the trier of fact. Instead the court bases its decision on the
specious reasoning that the plaintiffs by going on the pilgrimage
consented to an illegal arrest. There seems to be little justification
for such a statement either on the facts of the case" or on the law.4"
JAMEs A. MANNINO
,Golden v. Thompson, 194 Miss. 241, 11 So. 2d 906 (1943).
"237 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
"Id. at 829.
California has recently adopted this position in statutory form. See
CAL. GOVT. COPE §

820.6.

" See the excellent discussion in Mathes & Jones, supra note 12.
" The pertinent facts given are that the plaintiffs in letters between
themselves discussed the length of time they would remain in jail and made
arrangements for bail bonds and counsel. In one of the communications it
was said: "All in all, I think you can count on becoming familiar with
the Jackson jail . . ." The court held that from this a jury could find

that the plaintiffs consented to the arrest. This seems a doubtful conclusion
from the evidence. It seems more doubtful that a jury should be able to
question the motive of one exercising a constitutional right.
"'The only cases cited by the court for this proposition involved the

